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nyone trying to get clear about the
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medical research immediately faces
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immensely hard to get agreement on the value of
the enterprise strictly for humans. HJ. McCloskey,
for example, portrays the human stake in the
issue as being of apocalyptic proportions:
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Without continued animal experimentation
in the past, ... we should still be incapable
of checking the ravages of septicemia, gangrene, diabetes, and a host of other
diseases. Without continued experimentation we shall be exposed to the new strains
and new diseases that continue to emerge,
golden staphylococcal infection,
Legionnaire's Disease, AIDS, and the very
many other diseases that are emerging. I

the issue of a significant clash of important
human and nonhuman interests hard to avoid. I
am therefore interested in medical research
which exhibits the following qualities:

1. it targets widespread, debilitating diseases;
2. it has an admirable track record in using
animals to aid in our understanding and
management of the disease; and
3. it is conducted according to humane standards as they are currently understood.

But there are, of course, dozens of writers who
opine that the decline in mortality due to infectious diseases had much more to do with
refinement in hygiene and sanitation than with
medical techniques based on animal research. 2
Even on a much finer level of comparison,
apparently contradictory views are not hard to
find. Fred Davidson tells us that "the whole field
of nutrition has its foundation firmly rooted in
animal experimentation, which has led to the discovery of diet essentials (such as all the known
vitamins),"! while Sidney Gendin writes, "the
foundation of nutritional science was the discovery of vitamins, and their role in health owes
almost nothing to animal experimentation....
When we consider the possibility of alternatives to the use of animal models, we find that
those who are most insistent about the value of
medical experimentation are least sanguine
about potential alternatives. McCloskey, for
instance, calls the suggestion that needed information could be gotten without animal experimentation "little short of irresponsible.'" Dallas
Pratt, on the other hand, maintains that research
on several diseases is actually being slowed down
by our reliance on in vivo techniques. 6
In the light of all this, one might wonder
whether the question of the prudence of animalbased medical research weren't at least as controversial as the question of its morality. Surely,
insofar as such work is inessential - if we can
easily make do without its contributions, or attain
what results it does have to offer as well or better
elsewise - then not only do the prospects for its
successful moral defense pale to the point of
invisibility, but the whole thing becomes a sterile
ritual. My response to this uncertainty is to
structure criteria for a kind of animal-based
medical research which, if satisfied, would make
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I refer to any investigation meeting these criteria
as "exemplary" medical research, and conclude
that any such research at least meets the test of
prudence. Whether it passes the stricter test of
morality is the matter I will explore here.
II. Diabetes as a Case Study
Diabetes mellitus may not be at all a disease of
any drama, but research on its causes and cures
seems a likely candidate for inclusion under the
"exemplary research" rubric. For diabetes, while
yet widespread and debilitating, is no longer a
disease which is liable to condemn its victims to a
lingering and painful death, and this outcome is
as clearly traceable to animal research, and (until
recently) to animals as a source of insulin, as anything is likely to be. Before 1921 diabetics had no
better therapeutic recourse than to submit themselves to a severely restricted diet, which was calculated to walk the often fine line between the
amount of nutrition a patient had to have to live,
and the amount which would overtax her compromised metabolism, causing glycosuria, diabetic coma, and death. For severe diabetics this
therapy never involved more than a brief
extension of life, and it was never pleasant. "A
quarter of a cen tury after the discovery of
insulin," writes Michael Bliss in his history of the
research leading to the isolation of the hormone,
"doctors were reminded of ... preinsulin diabetics when they saw the pictures of the survivors
of Belsen and Buchenwald.'"
Insulin was discovered primarily through the
contributions of the Canadian scientists
Frederick Banting and Charles Best, in collaboration withJJ.R. Macleod,J.B. Collip, and several
dogs. The dogs were rendered diabetic and then
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treated with extracts of their own atrophied pancreases. The discovery had immediate and continuing therapeutic payoff. Bliss estimates that in
1920 between 0.5 and 2.0 percent of the population of the industrialized countries was diabetic; in a 1974 article, Best estimated that 130
million lives had been saved by the discovery of
insulin. 8 There are today half a million insulindependent diabetics in the U.S. alone. Even
stern critics of animal research, such as Peter
Singer and Andrew Rowan, have cited diabetes
research as having had great human value. 9
But granted that diabetes was (and remains)
widespread, and was (and to a lesser extent
remains) debilitating, and that great strides
against it were made through the use of animal
research, it still remains to show that continued
animal-based research on diabetes is of significance. Things are not as clear here - there have
been no further miracle breakthroughs with the
impact of the discovery of insulin - yet there is
reason to think that importan t progress is being
made.
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Although insulin has saved the lives of an
immense number of people, it is not a cure; diabetes is still widespread and still debilitates. It is
the seventh leading cause of death in the U.S.,
claiming about as many lives per year as arteriosclerosis or breast cancer, and about twice as
many as hypertensive disease or leukemia. 10
White males and females who are insulindependent suffer a mortality rate five to eleven
times greater than that for non diabetics of the
same age; the mortality rate for black insulindependent diabetics is about twice as high as
their white coun terparts. l1 In addition to the
increased risk of death, many diabetics suffer
greatly from nervous, vascular, and ocular complaints that often lead to such problems as
blindness, loss of limbs, and impotence.
Ongoing work in diabetes research is concerned with its etiology, which is still imperfectly
understood. It also addresses management of the
physical consequences of long-term treatment of
the diabetic state by exogenous insulin therapy, a
problem medicine didn't face before 1921. And,
of course, it seeks a cure. All this work uses
various kinds of animal models. For example, the
BB rat, a model of spontaneous diabetes, has
provided evidence that diabetes is (or may be) an
autoimmune disease; dogs are claimed to be
useful models for the study of ocular complications typical of human diabetics; diabetic Yucatan
miniature swine are prone to vascular complaints, a critical problem in human beings; and
the size and longevity of primates allow longitudinal studies not feasible in smaller animals. 12
That some of this work, at least, has therapeutic benefit is indicated by a 19 percent drop
in the mortality rate associated with diabetes
between 1970 and 1984.1> What is more, there is
in fact now a cure for the disease - transplantation of portions of the pancreas (so long as one
is willing to swap dependence on cyclosporine
for dependence on insulin). Many animal studies
preceded this clinical advance and accompany
ongoing efforts to refine it. There is currently
special interest in the use of fetal pancreatic
tissue as a graft source; diabetic rats have been
cured in this fashion.1< There are also attempts to
induce regeneration of insulin-producing cells;
interesting results have been achieved in rat
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models. And there is evidence of growing
interest in the use of xenografts as sources of
insulin producing tissue for diabetics. All this
contains the promise that however damaging to
the animal subjects involved, diabetes research is
paying off for humans and that we may even be
approaching effective therapies to end, rather
than simply manage, the disease.

can't simply recognize that nonhumans deserve
equal consideration of interests, and immediately
conclude that exemplary research is immoral, as
one can perhaps concerning such horrors as
maternal-deprivation studies. This leads me to
my third claim: much will depend upon whether,
and to what extent, the utilities available to
typical humans are richer and more numerous
than those available to typical nonhumans.
To raise this last point with respect to many
kinds of animal exploitation seems to me to be
just a way of asking whether humans are "utility
monsters" - so enamored of the taste of animal
flesh or the look of leather that our pleasure in it
outweights the pain we inflict in order to get it.
But I don't think that we need to distort our own
nature quite so much to make the issue troubling
in the context of exemplary research. Regan
holds that humans typically have greater opportunities for satisfaction than do nonhumans; this
is why death is by and large a greater harm for us
than for them. IS Sapontzis, on the other hand,
notes that the variant keenness of animal senses
makes it possible that nonhumans may have lush
avenues of enjoyment open to them which are
altogether closed to US. 16
I'm not going to try to adjudicate this dispute
now. It seems to me that given what we know
about animals and about diabetes, it wouldn't be
irresponsible for a person to conclude that
research on the disease was justified by the consequences. What is more troubling is the
distribution of those consequences: one grouphumans - reaps virtually all the benefits.
Another - nonhumans - bears virtually all the
burden. 17 If exemplary research is justified by
utilitarianism, it is justified in a way that brings to
life all the "textbook" refutations which allege
that utilitarianism could in principle mandate a
slave society.
This brings us to nonutilitarian considerations.
We intuitively shy away from the idea that we are
merely receptacles of utility, and utilitarians can
provide us with lots of plausible consequentialist
reasons why we can act and think of ourselves as
though we were something more. But those protections break down for nonhumans, and
indeed, for them, utilitarianism presents its
coldest, most calculating side. But the notion

Ill. Ethical Considerations
So, it seems reasonable to regard diabetes
research as something that it is prudent for our
species to want. Is it something in which it is
ethical for us to engage?
This is a huge problem, hinging as it does on
such perennially contested questions as how best
to reason about moral choice. My goal here is to
show how restricting our attention to exemplary
research focuses those questions. In particular, I
will examine the bearing of utilitarian and nonutilitarian perspective on exemplary research.
Is diabetes research justified on utilitarian
grounds? Like so many such questions, it's a difficult one to answer, especially as it requires not
simply the interpersonal but the interspecific
comparison of utilities. It seems very reasonable
to believe that the actual experiments Banting
and Best performed were not only a prudent
expenditure of resources (from a human point of
view) but even welljustified from an impartialist,
consequentialist perspective. But this is really not
the comparison we need to make. Apologists for
research often claim that it is the whole institution that ought to be assessed, not each individual experiment - which seems fair enough.
Accordingly, it isn't Banting and Best's extraordinary success that needs to be weighed against
the suffering of their animals, but the entire
stream of research which flows into and out of
their work, with all its reefs and obstructions.
I want to raise three points about this question
of the research's acceptability: one, that it is a
real question, one that poses the vital interests of
vast numbers of diabetics against those of many
research animals: this isn't a matter of sacrificing
animal in terests for taste or fashion. Second,
because it is a real question, it's a tough one to
resolve from a utilitarian framework. A person

Between the Species

198

FaU1989

Animal Models in 'Exemplary' Medical Research

that animals can be seen as mere receptacles is
under serious pressure from all sides: "marginal
case" arguments point to nonhumans' moral
analogs with handicapped members of our own
species; Sapontzis' work on the virtues points to
analogs with our especially admirable conspecifics;'8 and Regan and others have shown how
and why such central properties as being the
"subject of a life" also tie the value we bestow on
ourselves much more closely to the value we
should bestow on nonhumans. But I'm not going
to argue for this, directly, either. Rather, I'm now
going to proceed on the assumption that
inclusion in an impartial utilitarian calculus does
not exhaust what is of moral importance about
animals and display the consequences for exemplary research.
If nonhumans, pace utilitarianism, are protected by rights to life and to freedom from
unnecessary, nontrivial suffering, it might seem
that abolitionism simply follows. But that
inference is too quick. For one thing, not all nonhumans may possess the requisite characteristics
to be rights-bearers, and it is at least possible that
different individuals may possess their rights with
different degrees of stringency. For another, we
do not generally hold that the rights of human
persons secure them from any possible
infringement of their individual welfare, so that
even if animals generally possess rights of equal
stringency to those typically possessed by
humans, their involvement in exemplary medical
research is not necessarily ruled out
Regan's position, which presents itself as an
abolitionism, has suggestive implications for the
first of these challenges. To develop them, some
empirical information will be useful.
In 1988 the premier journal Diabetes reported
253 original experiments. Humans were the
animal of choice; 109 of the studies, or 43%,
were performed on members of our species. Of
the remaining 144 studies, 92 were performed
on rats (including 7 on rat cell lines), and 31 on
mice (including 2 on mice cell lines) . Ten studies
involved dogs; 3 involved chicks, rabbits or hamsters; and 3 involved other celllines. '9
The cell-line studies are the only ones that do
not violate Regan's "rights view." He takes all the
animals over a year of age to possess rights which
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protect them from this sort of experimentation,
while the chicks and any of the other baby
animals, who might have rights that could be violated by this usage, are given the benefit of the
doubt and classified as rights-bearers.

-

If t seems to me that given what we
II know about animals and about
diabetes[ it wouldn't be irresponsible for
a person to conclude that research on
the disease was justified by the
consequences. What is more troubling is
the distribution of those consequences:
one group -

humans -

the benefits. Another -

reaps virtually all
nonhumans -

bears virtually all the burden. If exemplary
research is justified by utilitarianism[ it is
justified in a way that brings to life all the
textbook' refutations which allege that
utilitarianism could in principle mandate a
slave society.

The strength of this argument will vary contextually. Forbearing to use immature or nonmammalian animals in exemplary research on the
grounds that they may be rights-bearers strikes
me as very similar to the argument that we ought
not to permit abortion because fetuses may be
persons. The abortion argument overlooks the
significance of the proposed restriction for
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allowable limits, since it may expose the child to
risk and danger in a cause that is not directly in
the child's interests. 2o Yet pediatric research goes
on - not, I think because of a social judgment
that children don't count for much morally, but
rather because parental discretion is taken to
range further than assumed in the above
position.
It has, in my view, been persuasively argued
that parents have the right to consent on behalf
of their children to participate in low-risk, mildly
invasive research, on the grounds that children
are members of the community to whose weal
the information is designed to contribute. They
are not freely floating atoms, but part of a social
whole; in part, at least, their good is a function of
its good. Thus, they are not simply means to its
ends; the ends of each overlap.21 Current federal
guidelines allow participation in studies involving
more than minimal risk, and which offer no
direct benefit to the child; parental proxy
consent must be supplemented by an institutional review board, which must determine that
the knowledge sought is indeed significant and
that the risk is not too great. 22
Does this suggest that nonhumans might at
least be exposed to the same degree of invasiveness, suffering, and risk in exemplary
research as that to which we are willing to expose
our children? Clearly, the disanalogous feature is
the roles that children and animals occupy in our
society outside of the research context. This
point is also germane to assessing the relevance
of relying on involuntary conscription as a
strategy for justifying exemplary research.
H.J. McCloskey has used this idea in the
course of arguing that, even granting that nonhuman mammals have rights of the kind for
which Regan argues, nothing very challenging
follows for exemplary research. 25 He directs our
atten tion to the infamous case in which Regan
supposes a dog to be stranded with four humans
in a lifeboat. If somebody needs to be tossed over
so that all the rest can survive, generally, Regan
says, the dog ought to go. McCloskey sees this as
committing Regan to the view that the rights to
life of moral agents as such are more stringent
than those of moral patients and continues,

women, of whose status as persons we are (or
should be) sure. Analogously, forbidding
research on Regan's grounds too cavalierly dismisses the moral significance of the victims of
diabetes, and of other debilitating and deadly
diseases.
Further, although Regan maintains that his
view implies that all those who have inherent
value have it equally, his argumen t for this
position depends mainly on rejecting the commensurability of intrinsic and inherent value.
Thus, the greater richness he is willing to
attribute to typical human experience is a matter
of intrinsic value, and hence not relevant to
determining fundamental moral rights, which
are a function of inherent value. But it seems
very likely that the psychological abilities undergirding inherent value are themselves had in a
graded fashion, so that inherent value may be
realized differentially, as such things as desire,
memory, preferences, and psychophysical
identity over time are realized differentially in,
say, rats and dogs.
The upshot of these considerations is that
exemplary research, since it is plausibly seen as
justified by utilitarian considerations, might
avoid running afoul of nonutilitarian constraints
by ceasing to use certain animal models. Among
its nonconsenting subjects, diabetes research
relies heavily on rodents. Perhaps work on dogs
and primates ought to be eliminated, and only
studies involving (preferably immature) rats and
mice continue, as such animals may have lesser
inherent value.
But even if all animals used in exemplary
research have equally stringent rights, there is
still reason to question whether complete abolition of all research on nonconsenting subjects
is morally necessary.
Quite a strong case might be marshalled for
abolition of invasive medical research on young
children. If we agree that children ought to be
regarded as ends-in-themselves, or anyway as protected by some such "deontological stop," then
an appeal to benefits gained can't solely justify
the interventions; if we regard parental prerogatives as justified solely by the parents' contribution to their children's good, then any proxy
consent on the part of a parent oversteps
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it is not only the right to life of persons that
may outweigh the right to life of a dog. The
rights to health, to bodily integrity, to selfdevelopment of persons, as rights of
recipience, may outweigh the rights of
mammals such as dogs to life, and freedom
from suffering.

M

animal research are not simply

questions about what ought or ought not
to go on in laboratories. These are

Hence, granted that mammalian rights are prima
facie rights of recipience, the

questions for all of us who benefit from

flood-gates are opened to justify animal
experimentation that is scientifically and
ethically well-planned, to secure for persons
the enjoyment of the more stringent rights
of persons, at the expense of the less
stringent rights of mammals.2<

contemporary health care. If we want
these benefits to continue, we may have
to participate ourselves in the research

He concludes that using animals as experimental
subjects would not therefore be treating them as
"mere receptacles" but rather as though they
were fairly chosen conscripts facing death and
injury in a just war.
Now, as apiece of in ternal criticism of the
rights view, this seems way off the mark. Regan's
belief that one could dump a million dogs off the
lifeboat to save one person doesn't hinge on any
general position about moral agents and moral
patients but rather about the relevance of
unequal harms faced by the possessors of equally
stringent rights. Nor does it seem at all clear how,
even if moral agents had some advantage over
moral patients regarding the stringency of their
right to life, it would follow that all their other
moral rights could trump the right to life of
moral patients.
But McCloskey's final point remains of some
interest, for involuntary conscription, like pediatric research, need not be based on any belief
about the lack of stringency of the rights of
children or conscripts. McCloskey's concern is to
justify the "special place" that animals are to have
in this system of conscription by virtue of their
lesser rights. Mine is to explore what the general
conditions on justified involuntary commitment
imply for research on the assumption that the
moral status of relevant nonhumans is equivalent
to that of humans.
Involuntary conscription may outrage libertarian sentiments, but it does seem that commu-
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oral questions concerning

process that produces them and at the
same time make nonhumans a part of the
moral community to whose good their
sacrifices contribute.

nities may face serious threats which can only be
met through conscription of its members.
Imagine the appearance of a variant of AIDS
which spread on casual contact and which did
not observe species barriers. I can see no serious
objection to conscripting both humans and nonhumans as research subjects in an effort to cure
the disease (which is not at all the same thing as
saying that researchers would have carte blanche
with their conscripts).
\Vhat of situations where it isn't so clear that
nobody has anything much to lose? Even in those
cases, I think, we're generally disposed to countenance conscription in the face of grave dangers,
when there is no practical way less restrictive of
liberty to meet the danger.
But while these conditions are probably necessary for justifying the involuntary conscription
of rights-bearers, they are surely not sufficient.
It may be instructive to look to the "just war"
tradition to illuminate the character of a threat
to which conscription is a defensible response.
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condition would have to be satisfied: all the conscripts must belong to the community being
threatened, in the sense that individual and community interests are in large measure shared, as
in the justification for pediatric research.
What motivates these conditions generally is
the need to make a real distinction between
serving the community as a slave and serving it
as a conscript. In McCloskey's conception the
assertion that animals used in research are
rights-holders has no apparent significance; they
are treated solely as means to ends in which they
have no stake. Things are different for those
justly conscripted to serve the community,
whether they be children in pediatric research
or soldiers fighting in a just war (if any there
be); these individuals have an in terest in the
community's maintenance and development.
Now, if Regan and others who hold to a strong
equivalence between the moral status of persons
and animals are right, then research - even
invasive, sometimes lethal research - might still
be permissible. But the character and the
context of that research would have to alter drastically. We would have to see ourselves as a community fully mobilized against disease, one
which regarded diabetes, cancer, AIDS, and so
forth as enemies against which we were prepared to direct the paths of our lives, not simply
to contribute money. But even if McCloskey is
right, and moral patients enjoy less stringent
rights than do moral agents, it does not follow
that casting research subjects in the role of conscripts will open any floodgates. For if research is
to be justified on these grounds, we are still
faced with the challenge of making animals a
part of the community to whose weal their sacrifice contributes. Otherwise, we treat them as if
they were mere receptacles of value, not valuable
in themselves.
Making animals members of this community
would be an immense task, and I am not sure
exactly what would constitute success. Minimally,
bringing about some substantial identity of
interests between humans and nonhumans
would require ending their exploitation at our
hands for food, clothing, and entertainment and
taking their interests seriously into account in
making public policy decisions that affect them.

Just war theory attempts to present and defend
conditions which justify trumping the rights of
others to life and to the enjoyment of their
property. It may be that in current contexts, or
even categorically, the burden of justifying war is
too great for those conditions to bear. But even
so, they may still be useful as guidelines for
trumping the rights of individuals involved in
nonvoluntary participation in medical research.
Two aspects of the tradition seem especially relevant: the insistence that the war in question be
winnable, and the condition of proportionality.25
Both of these conditions are intended to avoid
moral waste: the violence and other destructiveness associated with a war are not justifiable
unless the good aimed at is in fact attainable, and
no more such evils are justified than are absolutely necessary to attain the end.
It might seem that the conditions are too vague
to guide practice, but I think that need not be so.
Exemplary research's insistence on a demonstrable record of achievement in using animal
models to ameliorate disease coheres nicely with
the first of them and reinforces the condition as a
selection criterion for the kinds of diseases against
which invasive animal-based research may be
employed; concern with proportionality underscores the need to press on with refinement,
reduction, and replacement strategies.
Proportionality may also have an impact on
species selection. If, for example, one accepts the
suggestion that members of different species will
typically suffer different degrees of harm in being
restrained, or in dying, this condition would insist
on the use of those species which will suffer the
least. A proportionality condition might therefore
bolster the distribution of species typical of diabetes research and might dovetail with suspicions
about the unequal stringency of animal rights to
support a virtual ban on the use of animals other
than roden ts in research.
There are other reasonable requirements:
equity in the assignment of burdens, compensation for those who have served. And always, the
rights of conscripts must be respected insofar as
such respect is compatible with meeting the threat
that generates conscription in the first place.
But before these conditions come into play, a
more fundamental and much more problematic
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monkeys) to the kind of confinement and rigors
undergone by rodents altogether inequitable.
But if we have to look solely to involuntary conscription as a means of overcoming the presumption against using animals as means to our
ends, we may have to demonstrate our good faith
by participation in the process ourselves.

Even granted such sweeping changes, it may
seem that the situation of human conscripts is
too importantly different from those of animals
to justify the analogy. Conscripted soldiers, for
example, presumably feel an identification with
their community. There are likely to be individuals at home for whom they care, buteven if
not, they may well have a regard for the institutions, the traditions, and the values which characterize their society. It may not be too fanciful to
say that their own identities are constituted, in
part, by their community membership.
This kind of identification with individuals and
values isn't possible for nonhumans; their psychologies just don't work that way. But neither is
it possible for very young children. They, of
course, may come to care about their communities in ways nonhumans cannot. But if this is so,
it is likely to be because they will in fact benefit
from its flourishing. So perhaps it is not the
intensional state of caring about a community
that's key but the actual benefits that conscripts
receive from their community.
It's sometimes said that what animals really
need from us is simply to be left alone, but given
the impact of our species upon this planet, this is
probably too simple. And even were this not the
case, leaving animals alone is a radical departure
from our current practices and would involve
considerable forbearance on our part. A society
of that kind would be one in whosemaintenance
animals would have an interest. And although
the kind of health enhancement to which even
exemplary medical research would contribute
might not advance those interests further, it is
probably not in general necessary that conscripts
be personally benefitted by the contributions
they make. That a community is so structured as
to respect the rights of its members may itself be
sufficient grounds to see the interests of individuals and the community as something they
hold in common.
Furthermore, if the enterprise of research
medicine is really so important to us, we may
have to impose some kind of nonvoluntary participation in research by humans as well. Equity
does not demand identical treatment, of course;
there are differences in vulnerabilities among
species which would make subjecting humans (or
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IV. Conclusion
Ethical investigation of the use of animal
models in research at once needs to become
more fine-grained and more expansive in scope.
We would do well to pay closer attention to the
ways in which such an en terprise as diabetes
research differs from, say, toxicity testing or pain
research. We ought also to learn more about the
particular character of specific animal models.
But we should remember as well that the moral
questions concerning animal research are not
simply questions about what ought or ought not
to go on in laboratories. These are questions for
all of us who benefit from contemporary health
care. If we want these benefits to continue, we
may have to participate ourselves in the research
process that produces them and at the same time
make nonhumans a part of the moral community
to whose good their sacrifices contribute. 26
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